Third Prize winner of the Written Essay Awards for “Which Road for Southeast Asia?” Competition
| Title | Which Road for Southeast Asia? |
| Author | Punyathorn Jeungsmarn |
Which Road for Southeast Asia?
Punyathorn Jeungsmarn
September, 2023
As we move deeper into the 21st century, the utility of constructed national and regional boundaries is increasingly being challenged by globalization and anthropogenic crises, such as climate change. Nowadays, a financial crash in one nation could cascade across vast oceans; cultures unpredictably cross-pollinate in the digital ether; PM2.5 and heatwaves spread across boundaries. In this era, the function of terms such as “Southeast Asia” becomes ever more difficult to explain, even for Southeast Asians.
Ontologically speaking, Southeast Asia exists in theory. It exists because we constructed it. And the we who define Southeast Asia has never been a static entity. “The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: Volume One” states that before the second world war, studies of Southeast Asia often do not treat the region as a whole (Tarling, 1999), perhaps because its historiography was almost completely monopolized by Europeans who preferred colonial concepts like French Indochina, British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. Even if we look at key historical texts before high colonialism, the region is still being defined from the viewpoint of a more powerful we: the early use of the term “Nanyang” by imperial China is telling. Meanwhile, indigenous –a loaded term in itself – history is often confined to individual kingdoms, not the entire region (Tarling, 1999).
Southeast Asian studies became a more cohesive discipline in the aftermath of the second world war, coinciding with decolonization of Southeast Asian nations and the rise of national historiographies in each respective nation-state. Identities were constructed in tandem with borders that owe their existence to the clashes between colonial forces and pre-modern Asian empires. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN was only established in the 1960s and cannot be delinked from the ideological battles of the Cold War.
This exercise of historical deconstruction reminds us that Southeast Asia is a fluid concept. Nothing about the region is inevitable. What seems to deep-rooted primordial identity are often results of historical inertia. However, in times of rapid changes, inertia is extremely unreliable. Adaptation is the more sustainable way forward. But how do we begin to adapt?
The “The State of Southeast Asia 2023” report, published in February this year by the ASEAN Studies Centre at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, reveals that 82.6 of Southeast Asians see the regional organization ASEAN as “slow and ineffective, and thus cannot cope with fluid political and economic developments”.
The economic concern is collaborated by what Nikkei Asia considers “patchy economic performances” across the region, especially in the aftermath of global challenges like COVID-19, and the Russian war in Ukraine (Loh, 2023). Southeast Asian nations face uneven rates of growth and developments. This can be addressed through greater economic integration – a goal comprised of various elements, all of which are hindered by the inertia of ASEAN as a transnational organization and Southeast Asian nations as separated individual states.
Consider the need for free and standardized movement of labour as an example: Labor mobility reduces the impact of the unnatural boundaries of nation-states on the market; standardized labour law prevents human rights violation of transboundary workers. But while this has long been officially recognized as a key element of the ASEAN Economic Community or AEC, one would not say there is true free movement of labour in Southeast Asia, as one may find in the European Union (EU).
A key hindrance to labor mobility in Southeast Asia reflects a wider problem: the reluctance of ASEAN and Southeast Asian leaders to create common standards. While the EU makes it clear that free movement of labour is a fundamental right for all EU citizens, free movement of labour in ASEAN is patchily implemented through different agreements and frameworks (Lan, 2022). This patchwork of agreements all but ensure that the benefits of labor mobility are not consistently available. This problem stems from the inflexible adherence to the diplomatic norm of non-interference among ASEAN nations, which allows domestic legislation to take precedence over regional agreements.
This inflexibility means ASEAN as an entity often fails to take any joint political or economic stances. This failure is consequential, considering Southeast Asia’s unique position in the global stage.
Here, it might be prudent to briefly look back at the argument that Southeast Asia is not a concept that exists a priori. This is true – but historical contingencies, combined with inherent geographic characteristics have also made Southeast Asia an object of economic interest of larger political entities. This has been true for centuries, and is perhaps one off the clearest case of historical continuity within Southeast Asia. Long ago, it is a place where economic and cultural forces from the Indian peninsula and China’s kingdom(s) collide; then, it became a battleground of colonial forces; and now, it is the target for competition between China and the United States.
To protect the common interest of its member, Southeast Asian nations should employ the framework of ASEAN to make unified stanceson issues such as membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership or CPTTP – a multilateral economic agreement that would have not insignificant impacts on Southeast Asia as a region. This is something the EU has done in the past to great success. However, the aforementioned diplomatic norms hinder this.
The same problem prevails inthe political realm. Today ASEAN faces a serious decline in democratic governance and the adherence to human rights. The 2022 Myanmar coup, the exercise of power by Thailand’s military appointed senate to prevent the winner of the 2023 election to form the government, the victoryof Hun Sen’s claninthe rigged 2023 election: these are only a few examples. The trend away from democracy affects people across borders in Southeast Asia, resulting in the imprisonment of those who spoke up against the monarchy in Thailand, the disappearing and killing of activists in Laos (at least twice in 2023), and the ongoing human rights violation in Myanmar. Human rights, political rights and freedom of speech are rapidly regressing in Southeast Asia.
The need to solve problems on a regional basis is important since much of the human rights violations in Southeast Asia transcend national bounds: in 2023, the Free Laos group activist Bounsuan Kitiyano was killed in Thailand (AFP, 2023);Thailand’s pro-democracy activist Wanchalearm Satsaksit disappeared in Cambodia; the conflict in Thailand’s three-province Southern border concern ethnic and religious identities common to the Malaysia’s northern states; the fraught question of gender rights and religious identities are contemporary issues in both Malaysia and Indonesia.
The solution once again lies in the regional affirmation and standardization of rights-based value. Other regions with comparable levels of economic development as Southeast Asia has done this. For instance, Latin American and Caribbean nations adopted the Escazú Agreement in 2018, requiring states to investigate attacks against environmental human rights defenders. This is an example of how a regional agreement could address regional problems.
The failure of ASEAN to adequately produce a joint response to the ongoing human rights violation by the military government in Myanmar provides a contrast to the EU’s unified response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The fact that the representative of Thailand’s ministry of foreign affair has pursued unilateral actions in addressing the problem in 2023 epitomizes the lack of a unified regional response. If ASEAN had been able to make a strong condemnation of Myanmar’s military junta, perhaps the current crisis could be significantly alleviated.
However, the clearest cases of a common regional problem in Southeast Asia are environmental in nature. A classic example is the Mekong River, which flows through five countries in Southeast Asia, presenting a dilemma of shared resources. The fraught history of the Mekong River is a great reflection of Southeast Asia’s political position, with the birth of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) being heavily influenced by the United States’ Cold War ideology. In 2016, the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) became an international instrument through which China manages dam developments on the Mekong. The irony of the LMC invoking the perceived
indigeneity of the historical Lancang kingdom despite arguably being an instrument of contemporary neocolonialism should be noted.
The political implications of the MRC and the LMC aside, the Mekong River is a shared resources for millions of Southeast Asians, many of whom could not care less about who owns the river as long as they can still maintain their livelihood along the river. The constructions of dams will affect all such individuals (and many more considering the importance of the Mekong basin ecosystem) no matter their nationalities. Everyone has been and will be affected: from the fishermen in Laos and Thailand’s Isaan region, to those relying on the tourist industry around Tonle Sap, to the Vietnamese rice farmers of the Mekong delta. Considering the fact that the majority of those impacted by environmental degradation in the Mekong are Southeast Asians, it is high time that at least the five ASEAN riverine states initiate the creation of an agreement that protect environment and indigenous rights. The Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) is an imperfect model but is still an improvement over the limited roles of the MRC and the LMC.
Another recent example of a regional environmental crisis is the issue of waste trade. Following China’s decision to ban the import of waste to protect its own environment in 2018, large quantity of plastic and electronic waste from more developed corners of the world (especially the west) began to flow to Southeast Asia.
The waste trade problem presents an opportunity for ASEAN to take a clear stance to protect its own environmental sovereignty. In 2019, environmental NGOs made a joint statement for ASEAN to take such a stance (Peter, 2019), but to no avail. Even in multilateral meetings such as the Conference of Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste and Their Disposal over the past two years, ASEAN countries made no such joint statements. The African region, in contrast, often makes joint statements to protect themselves from waste imports. They went as far as to produce a multilateral agreement called the Bamako Convention, which prohibited the import of hazardous waste into the region of the signatories.
This could go on and on. Environmental problems such as ocean plastics, PM2.5, trade in endangered species are all regional problems that require solutions which transcend the inertia of national boundaries. They require not Thailand, Indonesia, Brunei, etc. to take multidirectional unilateral actions, but rather ASEAN as a whole to take unified multilateral action.
This is not to say that individual nations do not have responsibilities. Nation-states are constructed boundaries, but ones whose existence remain important to many people across the world. However, they have proven inadequate to address the problems of the 21st Century. This is why many regions have taken multilateral
approaches to solve shared problems. This is why global agreements are becoming more and more common. Unfortunately, if Southeast Asia continues on the current trajectory, then the voices of its population will not be heard in the deafening chorus on the global stage.
Still, it is important to bring back the question of constructing Southeast Asia as a concept in history. The voice of ASEAN can be strengthened, but if that voice only belongs to the leaders of nations, then the solutions will only reflect the desires of Southeast Asian’s top echelons. As Southeast Asia takes the next step into the Anthropocene, it is necessary to redefine the we once more. The next stage of Southeast Asian history can no longer be written by the imperial court of the Middle Kingdom, nor European colonialists, nor the nationalists of the 20th century, but rather by everyone living in the region, no matter what nationality and what identity.
“Which Road for Southeast Asia?” is a question we answer together.
References
AFP. (2023, June 8). Vanished, shot, murdered: Laos activists spooked by spate of incidents. Bangkok Post. https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/2587759/vanished-shot-murdered-laos-activists-spooked-by spate-of-incidents.
Lan, B.T.N. (2022, June). The Features of Free Movement of Labour in ASEAN and the European Union under Comparative Perspective (ASEAN Ideas in Progress Series 3/2022). Center for International Law, National University of Singapore. https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/3.-Ideas-in-Progress-2022- Bui-Thi-Ngoc-Lan.pdf
Loh, D. (2023, May 10). ASEAN’s patchy economic growth suggests long road to recovery. Nikkei Asia. https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/ASEAN-s-patchy-economic-growth-suggests-long-road-to-recovery2
Peter, Z. (2019, June 19). ASEAN Urged to Adopt Full Ban on Plastic Waste Imports. Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia_asean-urged-adopt-full-ban-plastic-waste-imports/6170330.html
Tarling, N. (Ed.). (1999). The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia Volume One: From early times to c. 1500. Cambridge University Press.
Biography:
Punyathorn Jeungsmarn is a researcher and environmental activist in Thailand. He has worked with two non-governmental organizations with focuses including campaigning against pollution, empowering communities, and policy advocacy. He has conducted research and written about issues ranging from environmental human rights, community resistance, plastic pollution and environmental/ health restoration. He has also conducted research on social issues such as collective memory and dynamics of social movement.
Organizer:
SEA Junction, established under the Thai non-profit organization Foundation for Southeast Asia Studies (ForSEA), aims to foste understanding and appreciation of Southeast Asia in all its socio- cultural dimensions- from arts and lifestyles to economy and development. Conveniently located at Room 408 of the Bangkok Arts and Culture Center or BACC (across MBK, BTS National Stadium), SEA Junction facilitates public access to knowledge resources and exchanges among students, practitioners and Southeast Asia lovers. For more information see www.seajunction.org, join the Facebook group: http://www.facebook.com/groups/1693058870976440 and follow us on Twitter and Instagram @seajunction
In collaboration with:
The JFK Foundation in Thailand was founded by H.E. Dr. Thanat Khoman, the former Ambassador to the United States, with the purpose of commemorating President Kennedy’s principles.
